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Abstract
We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a
Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the Recalibrational Model.
According to this dynamic model, new information about trust-based interaction outcomes
triggers specific sets of emotions. Emotions, in turn, recalibrate the short-sighted or long-sighted
programs in self and/or others that determine trust-based behavior propensity. Unlike Valence
Models that predict reports of large sets of emotional states according to interdependent positive
and negative affect alone, the Recalibrational Model predicts conflicted, mixed-affect emotional
states. Consistent with the Recalibrational Model, we observed reports of mixed-affect
(concurrent positive and negative) emotional states (e.g., strong simultaneous experience of
triumph and guilt). We discuss the implications of having “conflicted minds” for both scientific
and well-being pursuits.
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1. Introduction
The central aim of this paper is to investigate whether 20 emotions, reported by 170
participants after completing a Trust game and learning of its outcome, were experienced in a
patterned way that conforms to predictions of our proposed “Recalibrational Model” or
predictions of Valence Models. The Recalibrational Model predicts the experience of emotions
according to several dimensions (short-sighted, long-sighted, positive, negative, interpersonal,
and intrapersonal) while Valence Models often predict the experience of emotions according to a
positive-negative affect dimension alone.
The Recalibrational Model, shown in Figure 1, describes a dynamic process in which the
integration of new information (from trust-based decisions and interaction outcomes) triggers
emotions. Emotions, in turn, recalibrate conflicting behavior regulation programs 1, which we call
the “short-sighted” program (V), and the “long-sighted” program (U). The relative power of
these programs determines the extent to which an individual’s behavior in a trust-based
interaction trades off the short-sighted goal (opportunism) for the long-sighted goal (developing
a trust-based exchange relationship).
The first part of the proposed model (1.1 in Figure 1) describes how the relative
calibration of short-sighted and long-sighted programs ultimately determines Investor and
Trustee behavior propensity when individuals are confronted with a Trust game choice dilemma.
The second part of the model (1.2 in Figure 1) specifies how emotions, acting jointly in sets to
recalibrate the operation of short-sighted and long-sighted programs in both self and others, are
triggered by new information about Trust game outcomes. These sets of emotions
computationally identify and respond to the presence of specific adaptive problems based on
Trust game decisions and outcomes. A third part of this model (1.3 in Figure 1), untested with
this research, specifies the kinds of targeted recalibration effects (i.e., “positive” upregulation
and/or “negative” downregulation of short-sighted and long-sighted programs) that we expect
emotions to encourage, resulting in changes to behaviors in self and others.
1

“Programs”, from computational science, refers to neural circuits in the brain/body which process input
information and accordingly cause outputs either in the form of regulatory feedback (reused as input by programs)
or behavior. In support of our model, neural imaging studies provide confirmation of dual programs simultaneously
activating in subject exposed to decision dilemmas (McClure et al. 2004; Hare et al. 2009). Internally conflicting
programs with emotions as their co-evolved “guidance systems” may have been selected for because they can
provide efficient solutions to the dynamic problems of changing environments (Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Livnat &
Pippenger 2006).
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We used the various recalibration functions, proposed for the 20 emotions studied, to
determine how specific emotional states fit into five unique sets of the Recalibrational Model.
Consistent with the premise of competing programs in humans’ “conflicted minds”, we observed
participants frequently reporting mixed-valence emotional states (e.g., simultaneously
experienced triumph and guilt). Mixed-valence emotional states are not predicted by simpler
models still de riguer today, such as the bipolar affect Valence Model where positive emotions
or negative emotions are experienced as interdependent negatively correlated opposites (e.g., see
Lang et al. 1993; Ortony, Clore, & Collins 1988; Russell & Carroll 1999).
Below, we report the results of factor analysis and structural equation modeling,
providing evidence that the multivariate Recalibrational Model significantly outperforms the
Valence Model when describing the patterned experience of emotions reported after a Trust
game. These results support the theory that sets of recalibrational emotions are triggered in
patterned response to the adaptive problems produced by trust-based interactions.
1.1. Trust-Based Decision Dilemmas and Behavior Regulation by Short-Sighted and LongSighted Programs
When one is confronted with a dilemma, there is an internal conflict over how to pursue
alternative desired outcomes that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at their maxima. We study
such a dilemma modeled by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), which we refer to as the Trust
game. In the Trust game, an Investor first decides how much of a $10 endowment to send a
paired Trustee, with the amount sent tripled, and then the Trustee decides how much of the
tripled investment, or income, to return to the Investor.
The Trust game provides both short-sighted “opportunity” for gaining available resources
and the possibility of developing a trust-based exchange relationship – a long-sighted security
against the income risks associated with endowment asymmetry (such as resulting from the 50%
chance of being Investor in this kind of experiment).2 Short-sighted programs evolved to solve
the adaptive problem of competition for limited resources with fleeting availability by

2

While we study a single, anonymous interaction, our evolved psychology errs to caution by processing information
about one-shot interactions under the premise that they may in fact be repeated in the future (e.g., see Delton et al.
2011). We also suspect that Investors who make trust-based choices discover consequent effects on their payoffs and
extend this information in constructing generalizable models about the trustworthiness of Trustees in the population
(e.g., the experimental subject pool).
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encouraging capture of all resources present before they are depleted, foregone, or the possibility
of seizing them becomes less certain or riskier. Reliable trust based exchange relationships are
important securities that buffer against resource shortages and times of scarcity associated with
risky income (e.g., from hunting, where ‘lucky’ individuals with food share with ‘unlucky’
individuals without food, with the expectation of reciprocity when roles are reversed). Indeed,
laboratory studies have demonstrated that, in response to unsynchronized resource availability
among individuals in a common environment, people act pre-disposed to engage in
asynchronous trading relationships (Kaplan et al. 2012).
We propose that these adaptive problems, modeled by the Trust game, are regulated by
short-sighted and long-sighted programs (e.g., see Carrillo 1998; Kurzban 2010) in conflict with
one another (Livnat & Pippenger 2006). The relative calibrations of an individual’s short- and
long-sighted programs (determined by their unique histories, emotional capital, and present
demands) regulate individuals’ behavior propensity3 in dilemmas such as the Trust game (see
Figure 1). According to this dual program perspective, the Investor decision trades off his shortsighted “opportunistic” goal (achieved with earnings from a kept endowment and a maximally
profitable investment) with his long-sighted “cooperative” goal (achieved by developing an
exchange relationship in which both trust and trustworthiness are maximally demonstrated).
Likewise, the Trustee, having received a trust-based multiplied transfer of funds from the
Investor, must decide whether to pursue her short-sighted program’s goal (by keeping this
income), or else pursue her long-sighted program’s goal of developing a trust-based exchange
relationship by returning an amount equal to or greater than what the Investor originally sent and
thereby demonstrating her trustworthiness.
1.2. Recalibrational Functions of Emotions and Prediction of Emotional Experience
Based on a review of the emotion literature (see Schniter & Shields 2013) and our own
considerations, we conjectured emotions to have functional features and propose a classification
system that categorizes the twenty emotional states studied (see Table 1) according to
constellations of their shared functional features. We chose to classify and predict twenty
emotional states because they are frequently used in versions of the one-dimensional Positive
3

While we expect individual differences in degree (i.e., variance in relative strengths of regulatory programs or
emotions), we do not expect differences in kind (i.e., direction of calibrational effects), since we take the existence
of these programs to be species-typical adaptations.
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and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) developed by Watson et al. (1988), and predicted by the
Valence Model that we compare to the multidimensional Recalibrational Model.
Nesse (2004, p.1138) states that, while emotions have been selected for because of their
ability to solve specific adaptive problems, “...there is no one to one correspondence between an
emotion and a function. One emotion can serve multiple functions, and one function may be
served by several different emotions.” Consistent with Nesse, our functional classification of
twenty emotions yields five unique sets containing multiple emotions that we expect to be
triggered in concert for common functional purposes (i.e., to facilitate achievement of short- and
long-sighted program goals). We characterize these functions as positive and negative
recalibrations, intra and interpersonally targeting short- and long-sighted programs.
Generally, an adaptationist and functional perspective of emotions (e.g., Tooby &
Cosmides 1990; Buck 1999; Cosmides & Tooby 2000) argues that emotions facilitate behavioral
regulation by recruiting the assistance of a number of psychological, physiological, and
behavioral processes that provide either positive or negative feedback (pleasant and unpleasant
experience) used in updating the calibration of conflicting internal regulatory variables. Pleasant
experiences are rewarding and can incentivize approach behavior and continuation of the prior
behavior or interaction that triggered them (Watson et al. 1999; Carver & Scheier 1990).
Unpleasant experiences are costly and motivate a change, whether through behavior reduction,
avoidance, or aggression (Gray 1971). Of the set of twenty emotional states, we conjecture that
nine [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable] are
experienced as positive, one [surprise] could be either positive OR negative (forming the unique
Set 3), and ten [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed,
ashamed, guilty] are negative.
Emotions are ultimately designed to deal with adaptive problems requiring program
orchestration (Tooby & Cosmides 1990, Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). The optimal calibration of
programs managing an individual’s behavior in a particular interaction depends in part on the
calibration of other’s behavior regulation programs. To solve this adaptive problem, emotions
facilitate the achievement of program goals via intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior
regulation (e.g., see Levenson 1999; Van Kleef et al. 2004; Butt, Choi, & Jaeger 2005). Below
we discuss emotions with intrapersonal effects (reinforcing, maintaining, or changing one’s own
behavior), and interpersonal effects (reinforcing, maintaining, or changing another’s behavior).
4

When one’s prior actions did not succeed in achieving an adaptive goal, intrapersonal
negative emotions are triggered to recalibrate one’s own regulatory programs (GómezMiñambres & Schniter 2012). For example, guilt, an intrapersonal emotion triggered exclusively
in response to a failure of the long-sighted program, recalibrates (i.e., downregulating) one’s
short-sighted program, decreasing the value of immediate opportunistic payoffs. As a result,
valuation of the long-sighted goal increases, affecting the ability to “commit” to its pursuit
(Frank 1988). On the other hand, when one’s prior actions have succeeded in achieving an
adaptive goal, positive emotions are triggered and recalibrate regulatory programs in the self to
ensure further achievements. For example, the experience of feeling believable and proud occurs
when positive emotions are triggered by the decision to engage in cooperative behavior. These
positive intrapersonal emotions upregulate the long-sighted program (relative to the short-sighted
program) so as to further encourage the behavior that led to successful cooperation. We
conjecture that, of the twenty emotional states studied, seven [triumphant, inspired, secure,
proud, believable, surprised, guilty] are exclusively intrapersonal.
Another way that emotions are designed to function is interpersonally: by regulating
others’ programs in an effort to affect interaction behaviors with one’s self. For example,
consider the gratitude emotion. Discovery that another has foregone short-term rewards in the
pursuit of a long-term exchange relationship with one’s self, for example by providing resource
or assistance, presents a fortunate relationship building opportunity for the recipient. Gratitude
and appreciation can signal one’s favorable valuation of the other and propensity to cooperate
with them (Tooby & Cosmides 2008), encouraging future trust much in the way that “promises”
do (Schniter, Sheremeta, & Sznycer 2012). Experimental evidence supports this functional
account of grateful and appreciative feelings (Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver 1968; Algoe, Haidt, &
Gable 2008; McCullough et al. 2001).
We conjecture that most of the emotions studied (thirteen of twenty), function both
intrapersonally and interpersonally. By initiating self-imposed recalibrations with the functional
equivalence of recalibrations that the offended party might otherwise impose, shame and
embarrassment downregulate the other’s non-cooperative inclination so as to preempt targeted
inter-personal recalibrations of one's self. For example, shame could preempt another’s anger or
disgust reaction if it preemptively led to self-punishment and distancing one's self from the other.
Likewise, the appeasement function of embarrassment may act remedially; by effectively
5

allowing rule violators to hedonically punish themselves, the angry and aggressive responses of
offended parties are preempted (Keltner, Young, & Buswell 1997; de Jong 1999).
While we conjecture that fifteen of the twenty emotional states studied may facilitate the
achievement of either short- or long-sighted progams’ goals, we consider five emotional states to
exclusively facilitate achievement of the long-sighted program’s goal. Of these we derive two
unique sets: a positive Set 2 [proud, believable] and a negative Set 5 [embarrassed, ashamed,
guilty]. The positive emotional states that facilitate both short-sighted and long-sighted programs
[appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure] form the unique Set 1. The
negative emotional states that facilitate both short-sighted and long-sighted programs [disgusted,
jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad] form the unique Set 4. We next explain
how, according to the recliabrational theory, emotions are triggered by computationally
assessments of successes and failures in the Trust game.
Our recalibrational theory of emotions is built around conflicting short-sighted and longsighted behavior regulation programs, which determine an individual’s choices when faced with
decision dilemmas, such as in the Trust game. We propose that the emotions facilitating
achievement of these programs’ goals computationally assess game outcomes for the purpose of
identifying and reacting to successes and failures of the short-sighted and long-sighted programs
(in self and other). According to our model, emotions are “triggered” when they integrate
information about the Trust game outcome and computationally identify specific successes and
failures. We label these computational triggers L and S, for the long-sighted program’s goal
achievement and the short-sighted program’s goal achievement, respectively.
We define the following variables observed in our Trust game: endowment (= e), amount
sent by Investor (= s), amount returned by Trustee (= r). We calculated success (with a maximum
of 1 and minimum of 0) of the short-sighted program achieving its goal (S) according to
competing perspectives of the Investor (I) and Trustee (T):
SI = (e – s + r)/(e + 2s)
ST = (3s – r)/3s if s > 0, else 0.
We calculated success (with a maximum of 1 and minimum of 0) of the long-sighted
program achieving its goal (L), based on the mutual perspective shared by Investor and Trustee:
LI,T = Trust * Trustworthiness,
where Trust = s/e, and Trustworthiness = min{r/s, 1} if s > 0, else 0.
6

S evaluates the short-sighted program’s goal achievement after Investor and Trustee
decisions have been made. In addition to valuing any portion of the endowment kept, an
Investor’s short-sighted program values maximally recouping profitable returns on any
investment made. Thus, to reasonably evaluate opportunity captured by an Investor we consider
how much of the endowment was kept and how much of the multiplied investment was recouped
by calculating (e – s + r)/(e + 2s). Accordingly, an Investor’s S is maximized (= 1) when all
endowment was kept (in which case s = 0 and r = 0), or if – in addition to any endowment kept –
the maximum possible profitable return from the investment was recouped (i.e., r = 3s). A
Trustee’s S is maximized (= 1) when s > 0 and r = 0 and is minimized (= 0) when either s = 0 or
when s > 0 and r = 3s.
The consummation of a cooperative trust-based relationship requires that both trust and
trustworthiness be demonstrated. Trust is demonstrated by the invested amount of endowment at
risk. Trustworthiness is demonstrated by proportion of investment voluntarily reciprocated to the
Investor. A cooperative trust-based relationship fails to be established when either the Investor or
the Trustee has pursued maximum opportunism. As such, L = 0 when s = 0 or when r = 0.
In summary, emotions are triggered by computational assessments of short- and longsighted programs’ successes and failures. Positive emotional states are maximally experienced
when trigger values are largest (= 1) and negative emotional states are maximally experienced
when trigger values are smallest (= 0). According to their design functions, triggered emotions
either contribute to the reinforcement of successes or the reduction of failures by upregulating or
downregulating specific programs in self and others. We tested whether constellations of specific
antecedents (the L and S triggers produced by Trust game interaction) reliably predict specific
sets of emotional experiences.
2. Design, Predictions and Procedures
2.1. Natural Experiment Design
We conducted a Trust game in which the Investor received an endowment of $10 and
could send any portion of it to the Trustee, with the amount sent tripled. The Trustee then
decided how much of the tripled investment, or income, to return (or else keep). Following the
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Trust game we administered a 20-item emotional status survey4 in which participants reported
how much they felt each of 20 emotional states (on a five point scale labeled (1) very slightly or
not at all, (2) a little, (3) moderately, (4) quite a bit, (5) extremely) as a consequence of their
recent game interactions and outcomes. The computer software presented all emotional states on
one screen and in random order. Using this laboratory implementation of the Trust game, which
engaged participants in one-shot anonymous economic interactions, and a well-established
emotional status survey, we investigated whether emotional experiences were reported in a
patterned and predicted way as a consequence of game outcomes.
2.2. Predictions
Inspired by functional theories of social emotions (Trivers 1981; Cosmides & Tooby
1989), Nesse (1990, p.275; 1999, p.458) made various predictions about how specific emotions
mediating reciprocity would be triggered by the four types of interaction patterns produced by a
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. To our knowledge Nesse’s predictions have not yet been
tested. This paper takes a similar natural experiment approach and examines the relationship
between participants’ endogenous generation of Trust game outcomes and consequential reports
of emotion. Like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Trust game is another model for transactions
require trust, albeit a model of asynchronous (rather than synchronous) trust-based exchange.
With the set of predictions below, generated by Valence Models and the Recalibrational
Model, we tested assumptions and compared how well different models of emotional experience
predict the emotions reported by participants who had just completed Trust games.
Valence Models
P1: In all three versions of the Valence Model, predicted in P1.1-P1.3 below, emotions
show positive correlation within the Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) set.
P1.1: PA & NA sets are independent: no correlation (= 0) is expected between them.

4

To avoid experimenter demand effects that might result by soliciting reports on only a few select emotional states
commonly ascribed to failed trust-based interactions (i.e., anger and guilt) and identified in the literature (e.g.,
Ketelaar & Au 2003), we constructed a survey of a large array of emotional states, based on the Positive and
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS), a self-report measure of positive and negative affect states developed by Watson et
al. (1988) that has been demonstrated across large non-clinical samples to be a reliable and valid measure of these
states (Crawford & Henry 2004).
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P1.2: PA & NA sets are strictly interdependent with negative (= -1) correlation between
them. Consistent with a purely “bipolar” model of valence, reports of simultaneously
experienced strong positive emotion and strong negative emotion are unexpected.
P1.3: Interdependence is unrestricted between emotions in the PA & NA sets. While
negative correlation is expected between sets, positive correlation between items in PA &
NA sets can also occur.
Recalibrational Model
P2: Conflicted minds produce mixed emotions: at times involving positive correlation
between (simultaneously experienced) positive and negative emotions.
P3: Emotion experiences are reported in a patterned way according to a multivariate set
of shared recalibrational features (i.e., positive and/or negative recalibration effects,
targeting short- and/or long-sighted programs, intra and/or interpersonally).
P4: L and S (variables evaluating outcomes from Trust game interactions) predict the
patterned experience of emotions for the 4 testable sets of the Recalibration model better
than for the 2 sets of the Valence models.
2.3. Experimental Procedures
The experiment, programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), was conducted at
Chapman University’s Economic Science Institute. Participants were recruited from a campuswide subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students.
There were eight experimental sessions, each lasting approximately thirty-five minutes.
No participant participated more than once. Each session had between 18 and 24 participants,
seated in individual cubicles, and was conducted as follows. An experimenter read the
instructions aloud explaining experimental procedures and payoffs while every participant
followed along with their own copy of the instructions. After finishing the instructions,
participants were given five minutes to privately write down their answers to several quiz
questions. After participants completed the quiz, the experimenter distributed a printed copy of
the correct quiz answers. To ensure understanding, any remaining questions were answered
privately.
Participants, randomly assigned to one of two roles: “person 1” (Investor) or “person 2”
(Trustee), interacted anonymously in the Trust game over a local computer network, then
9

completed the 20 item survey in which they reported the intensity of various emotional states
consequent on their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. Earnings from the
Trust game plus $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and participating were paid out
privately at the end of the experiment.
3. Results
In this section, we report general results of the Trust game and the emotional status
survey. In section 3.1 we investigate whether 20 emotions were experienced in a patterned way
that conforms to predictions of the Recalibrational Model or predictions of Valence Models. In
section 3.2 we examine the full models of emotional experiences according to four triggers
(based on computation of adaptive problems consequent of economic decisions and interactions),
comparing the fit of the unrestricted Valence Model and the Recalibrational Model.
We found no significant differences between the eight sessions and report the joint results
of all 170 participants. Figure 2 displays the scatter plot of the amount sent and the amount
returned. There was substantial variability in individual behavior. On average, Investors sent
$6.01 (SD = 3.64) and Trustees returned $6.16 (SD = 5.92), resulting in profits of $10.14 (SD =
3.72) and $11.88 (SD = 7.12), respectively. These results are consistent with previous findings of
Berg et al. (1995). Likewise, there was substantial variability in individual reports of emotional
experience. The average reported emotional state (as a result of Trust game interactions) had a
mean of 2.20 (median = 1, SD = 1.45), near 2 (“a little”). Ratings on every emotional state
ranged from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). While the modal report for most
(17/20) emotional states was 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) modes were also seen at 3 for happy
and 5 for content and appreciative. Reports of 1 were more frequent for emotional states in the
negative set than for the positive set (1218/1700 versus 527/1700, respectively), contributing to
significantly lower intensity of reported negative states (M = 1.61, SD = .77) than positive states
(M = 2.80, SD = 1.08) according to Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests (Z = 7.605, p < .001). This
pattern of significantly lower reported negative states was observed in both Investors (Z = 5.853,
p < .001) and Trustees (Z = 4.888, p < .001).
3.1 Shared Features of Emotions
Valence Models assume two factors: one comprised of a standard set of positive
emotional states that positively correlate with one another [appreciative, happy, content,
10

cheerful, triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable, and surprised], and the other
comprised of a standard set of negative emotional states that positively correlate with one
another [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed,
ashamed, and guilty] 5. Using exploratory factor analysis, we rejected that a two-factor model fit
the data best, as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was inferior to models with three, four,
five, six, seven, and eight factors6. Consistent with P1, item analysis indicated that not all (43 of
45) correlations were significantly positive between positive states nor between all (36 of 45)
negative states.
Consistent with P1.3 and P2, cross tabulation indicated occurrences of simultaneously
experienced positive and negative emotional states. Among all reported emotional states, we
observed 57 cases from 13 (7.64% of) respondents reporting positive and negative states that
were both felt “extremely” (= 5); 231 cases from 34 (20% of) respondents reporting positive and
negative states that were both felt in the range from “quite a bit” to “extremely” (≥ 4); 973 cases
from 69 (40.59% of) respondents reporting positive and negative states that were both felt in the
range from “moderately” to “extremely” (≥ 3); and 2653 cases from 114 (67.06%) respondents
reporting positive and negative states that were both felt in the range from “a little” to
“extremely” (≥ 2).
We used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 7 to measure how well our data on reported
emotional states fit the Recalibrational Model and variants of the Valence Models. Each variant
of the Valence Model shares the assumption that positive correlations exist among individuals’
reported positive states and positive correlations exist among individuals’ reported negative
states. Therefore, in all Valence Models we constrained each emotion to load onto only one of
the two factors. However, because each variant of the Valence Model has a different assumption
concerning relationships that might exist among simultaneously experienced of positive and
negative states, they differ only in the constraints they impose on the positive and negative factor
correlations. Model 1 constrains the factors to have a zero correlation (where positive states bear
5

These “standard” sets were based on the PANAS (e.g., Watson et al. 1988).
Results are available upon request.
7
We used Stata version 12.1 and the ‘SEM’ procedure (Structural Equations Model) finding the fit for maximum
likelihood. One participant was dropped who reported the same value for all emotional states. Additionally, we
omitted surprise from both the Recalibrational Model’s and Valence models’ fit tests because, being the only
emotional state included in the Recalibrational Model Set 3, it would have produced an automatic significant loading
within the Recalibrational Model, unfairly biasing results in its favor.
6
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no relationship with negative states), Model 2 constrains the factors to a correlation of negative
one (as would be appropriate if the experience of emotional states was only possible on a bipolar
continuum), and Model 3 imposes no restrictions on the factors’ correlation.
Summaries of factor analysis results for the three Valence models and the Recalibrational
model are shown in Table 2. The lesser Bayesian information criterion (BIC), lesser root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA), greater comparative fit index (CFI), and greater loglikelihood (LL) made it apparent that Model 1 fit better than Model 2, and that Model 3 fit better
than Model 1. The difference between Model 3 and Model 1 was statistically significant (X2(1) =
48.01, p < .001). Consistent with P1.3, Model 3’s correlation between positive and negative
factors was -.70 and significantly different from zero and from -1 (p < .001, 95% CI [-.787, .614]).
We used CFA to evaluate the fit of nineteen emotions in their functional sets derived
from the Recalibrational Model. In Table 2 we describe this derived fit as “Model R”. Model R
predicted the patterned experience of emotions according to the four factors corresponding to Set
1, Set 2, Set 4, and Set 5 of the Recalibrational Model (see Table 1). Consistent with P3, all
emotional states loaded positively and significantly (at a 1% level) onto the predicted latent
factors of Model R, but not the predicted latent factors of Valance Model 3.8 With a greater LL,
greater CFI, lesser RMSEA and lesser BIC, Model R provided a better fit than the unrestricted
Valence Model 3 (according to guidelines set forth by Gefen et al. (2011)).
3.2. Comparison of Structural Equation Model Fit
We used Structural Equation modeling to compare the fit of the Recalibrational Model to
the fit of the Unrestricted Valence Model. To compare these models we tested both with triggers
S and L, as computed from game interactions. Results of both exercises are shown in Table 3.
Given that we did not find support for either perfect independence or interdependence in section
3.1, we did not restrict correlations and allowed all latent factors to freely correlate in both
models. 9 The Recalibrational Model has more factors than the Valence Model which could
arguable lead to “overfitting” – having a better fit by describing more error instead of predicted
8

Results available upon request.
Comparative measures penalized for additional variables. Given that all between factor correlations were
significant for the unrestricted Valence Model but not for the Recalibrational Model, this choice should bias against
the Recalibrational Model’s relative fit superiority.
9
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relationship. To avoid overfitting, we report the BIC, which penalizes for added variables.
Finally, we report the difference between models, assessing whether the better fit was
statistically significant despite the difference in factors seen in Table 3.
As with CFA, we found superior results for the Recalibrational Model, consistent with
P4. Despite penalizing for additional fitted variables, the difference was significant. In the
Recalibration Model, all of the latent DV triggers’ coefficients were significant (below 5%) with
the predicted sign (see Table 4), whereas in the Unrestricted Valence Model not all (17 of 19) of
the trigger’s coefficients were significant (see Table 4). Finally, we found the overall equation
level goodness of fit higher for the Recalibration Model.
4. Discussion
Using confirmatory factor analysis to assess latent sets, and structural equation models to
assess triggers on latent sets we demonstrated that the Recalibrational Model predicts the
experience of predicted emotional states (specifically, five latent sets of these) following the
Trust game, strongly and significantly outperforming the Valence Models. While neither model
has very good “approximate model fit” according to guidelines proposed by Hu and Bentler
(1999), we caution readers that there is substantial disagreement in the literature about
interpreting such guidelines (Marsh, Hau, & Wen 2004; Beauducel & Wittmann 2005; Fan &
Sivo 2005; Yuan 2005; Tomarken & Waller 2005; Barrett 2007). The important take-away from
results of our model comparisons is that we provide an improvement over the widely accepted
Valence Models used in predicting emotional reports. In addition to better fit, our Recalibrational
Model is interpretable because it is derived from principles of “recalibrational theory”. Below we
discuss potential sources of unexplained variance, consider future directions for further exploring
the predicted effects of recalibrational emotions on trust-based interactions, and suggest some
implications of having conflicted minds for both scientific and well-being pursuits.
We consider two potential classes of explanations for currently unexplained variation in
how strongly emotional experiences are rated by participants: first, that participants either have
imperfect access to their emotional states, differing interpretations of the emotion labels, or the
fidelity of their reports is compromised, and second, that there is heterogeneity in the experience
of certain emotions (e.g., guilt).
People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be able to accurately describe their
emotional states (Ellsworth & Tong 2006) if emotion experiences are more often and accurately
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described with multiple words (Izard 1977), or with different words among different people.
While we acknowledge that language could present problems for this research, the success of
previous research on self-reported emotions in conjunction with experimental games (Ketelaar &
Au 2003) gave us encouragement in pursuing measures of self-reported emotions following an
economic game. Nevertheless, analysis of emotion reports revealed a “floor effect” that might
have resulted from a problem with the instrument used, untruthful results, pathological
inactivation of emotions in the studied context, a problem interpreting emotion labels, and
difficulty identifying and reporting emotional states.
Nemanick and Munz (1994) suggested that the PANAS scale’s lower anchor may not be
properly constructed to form a true lower pole. The PANAS response option “1”, the lowest
response possible on the five point Likert, is labeled with a combination of two state levels: “not
at all” and “very slightly”. By combining both state levels into a single response option a larger
proportion of response types from the possible spectrum (not at all to always) may accumulate at
that value. Future research should consider restructuring the response options and testing
whether a different distribution of responses results.
Data quality may also have been affected if participants made untruthful reports.
Experimental economists are particularly concerned that participants “will not ‘tell the truth’
unless incentives make truth telling compatible with maximizing utility” (Lopes 1994, p.218).
According to a meta-review by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) there is no clear evidence that
additional financial incentives would improve the quality of responses in a simple survey task
like ours. In fact, it has been noted that for short tasks like PANAS surveys that people are
known to voluntarily complete without problem (because they have sufficient intrinsic
motivation to do so), an attempt at increasing participation via financial incentives often
“backfires” with counter-intentional effects (e.g., see Mellstrom & Johannesson 2008).
Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that participants may have been incentivized to use
efficiency tactics to expediently complete the survey (such as marking all responses with the
same), we reviewed our data and found only one apparent case10 of such behavior (< 1% of
sample).

10

This individual reported 3s on all emotions.
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Frequency dependent selection can produce relatively stable mixed types in a population
(e.g., see Lomborg 1996), a phenomenon that might contribute to individual variation in
emotional reports (Ketelaar 2004; Mealey 1995). For example, sociopaths who comprise about
5% of the adult population (Mealey 1995) do not respond to remedial social gestures and likely
lack emotions like guilt that facilitate the long-sighted program (e.g., see King-Cases et al.
2008). We are unable to account for individual variation in types that exist in our sample.
A battery of 20 emotional states (like in the PANAS) may be too broad for the purpose of
studies like ours. Self-access to some of the emotional states studied may be limited and
interpretation of labels may not be uniform. We chose this battery because it is comparable
among widely used measures of multiple emotional states, however future studies on trust and
emotions would benefit from a select set more appropriate to the problems studied. In selecting a
refined set, universally interpretable and recognizable emotional states should be considered. We
suggest appreciative, happy, proud, frustrated, angry, and guilty: a selected set with balanced
valance that is representative of the functional categories covered by our model. Additionally, we
observed that the emotional states represented in this selected set were individually predicted
well (see Table 4) and demonstrated less of a floor effect than the other emotional states we
studied (total 1s reported were 479/1020 or 47% versus 1266/2380 or 53.2%, respectively).
By triangulating with more objective neurological, physiological, and behavioral
measures of emotional states some of the discussed limitations of itemized self-reports could be
overcome. While untruthful reporting and reports by abnormal types in the population may occur
and should be of consider by future research, we do not expect that these factors account for a
large portion of observed variance.
While we have developed theory of emotions’ ultimate function (i.e., what the
mechanisms were selected to do) and derived our predictions of antecedents from it, this study
only tests the emotions’ proximate functioning (i.e., how and when the mechanisms are
triggered). Future studies can take the Recalibrational Model one step further and test for
ultimate functions by examining whether the future actions of those individuals who report
emotions under the predicted conditions are affected as theory predicts. Three studies which we
know of have taken this approach to testing ultimate functions already: Ketelaar and Au (2003)
who demonstrated how the experience of guilt leads to choices of cooperation over opportunism,
Fehr and Gachter (2002) who demonstrated that angry individuals are more likely to engage in
15

costly punishment, and Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) who have shown that Investor happiness
and gratitude increase trust in the Trust game.
The experience of mixed emotions has been discussed by others (Cacioppo, Gardner, &
Berntson 1999) and evoked with wins and losses in the laboratory (Larsen, McGraw, &
Cacioppo 2001; Larsen et al. 2004), as well as by trust-based interaction in our study. However,
mixed emotions are not well appreciated as a core trait of human nature, and may appear as flaws
of human nature that interfere with rationality (Sherer 1984; Elster 1995). While some
researchers have long moved past the bipolar affect models, instead recognizing that positive and
negative affect are at times independent dimensions (e.g., see Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 1988),
psychophysiologists (Driscoll, Tranel, & Anderson 2009; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm
1993) neuroscientists (Proverbio, Zani, & Adorni 2008; Screenivas, Boehm, & Linden 2012)
behavioral economists (Morretti & di Pellegrino 2010; Brandts, Riedl, & van Winden 2009; Van
den Berg, Dewitte, & Warlop 2008; Morris 1995) and decision scientists (Hogarth, Portell,
Cuxart, & Kolev 2011; Reid & Gonzalez-Vallejo 2009; Schlosser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer
2013) continue to use bipolar affect scales (for example, the Self-Assessment-Manikin valence
scale developed by Lang (1980)). Our study cautions against assuming that the explanatory
power provided by the Valence Model is sufficient for understanding relationships between trustbased behavior and emotions. We suggest that more complex multivariate models, such as the
Recalibrational Model, better track the triggered experience of mixed emotions and subsequent
behaviors.
In light of our model, we have identified the mechanics that could produce an emotional
equilibrium between partners: a condition in which the emotional impact of partners’ behavior
on each other and on themselves is one in which all engaged programs are kept in the same
relative state (before and after action). An important implication of this stable equilibrium is that
even under such conditions, the mind is expected to remain conflicted. The recognition of a
conflicted mind and the experience of mixed emotions challenges our intuitions of a “self’s”
singular internal interests and the consonance of a non-contradictory self-representation
generally attributed to a sane mind. While the implications of a modular recalibrational theory of
emotions might be existentially and even epistemologically difficult to grapple with, we extend
the following practical implications for mental health professionals and laypeople alike.
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Psychotherapists often treat patients who complain of and suffer from emotional states –
and it is not uncommon for patients that patronize these professionals to seek an escape from
unwelcomed emotions (e.g., Nesse 1991, 2000). Treatment of these emotions, whether through
behavioral intervention or psycho-pharmaceutical treatment, may benefit from the degree to
which psychologists, psychiatrists, and counselors are informed of (1) the functional uniqueness
and similarities distinguishing the emotions and their taxonomic classifications, and (2) the
choice dilemmas and post-decision situations from which emotional states precipitate. The
Recalibrational Model suggests that it is unrealistic and potentially harmful for wellbeing
pursuits to aspire for a purely “positive” emotional state via complete transcendence or removal
of “negative” emotional states. Life entails suffering and happiness because both positive and
negative emotional states serve needed functions, recalibrating our own inner-workings as well
as the inner-workings of those that we interact with. Given the uncertain future, we need to
constantly engage in recalibration of ourselves and others to make the most of opportunities
given our needs.
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Figure 1. Complete Recalibrational Model
(1.1) Interaction in
Trust Game

(1.2) Outcome
Determines
Emotions

(1.3) Emotions
Recalibrate
Behavior
Propensity

Note: (1.1) Investor (i) and Trustee (t) each have two weights U and V, where U ≥ 0 and V ≥ 0, determining the relative power of
conflicting long-sighted and short-sighted programs, respectively. The balance of weights determines behavior propensity via decision
function, where U weakly increases and V weakly decreases amount sent (= s) or amount returned (= r), for the Investor (i) and
Trustee (t), respectively. (1.2) Emotions compute trigger values S and L resulting from game outcomes. Positive emotional states are
maximally experienced when their trigger values are largest (= 1) and negative emotional states are maximally experienced when their
trigger values are smallest (= 0). (1.3) The weights are up- and down-regulated by arrays of positive and negative emotions
produced by self and other. Thus the weights are dynamically updated after being targeted by recalibrational emotions.

Figure 2. Bubble Plot of the Amount Sent and the Amount Returned.
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Note: Observations were plotted with bubbles, where the relative size indicates the number of observations. The smallest
bubble plotted represents one observation and the largest bubble plotted represents eight observations.

Table 1: Specific Classifying Features of Emotional States with Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Targets
Functional Features
Set

Emotional State
Appreciative

1

2
3

4

5

Facilitating
Adaptive Goal(s)
U: Long-sighted
V: Short-sighted
X
X

Recalibrational Effect
Positive
X

Negative

Recalibrational Target
Intrapersonal
U

Interpersonal
U

Happy

X

X

X

U,V

U

Content

X

X

X

U,V

U
U

Cheerful

X

X

X

U,V

Triumphant

X

X

X

U,V

Inspired

X

X

X

U,V

Secure

X

X

X

U,V

Proud

X

X

U

Believable

X

X

U†

Surprised

X

X

X

U‡

Disgusted

X

X

X

X

U

V

Jealous

X

X

X

U

V

Aggravated

X

X

X

U

V

Frustrated

X

X

X

U

V

Angry

X

X

X

U

V

Depressed

X

X

X

U

V

Sad

X

X

X

U

V

Embarrassed

X

X

V

V

Ashamed

X

X

V

V

Guilty

X

X

V

Note: X’s indicate classifying features of emotional states. Cells populated under “Intrapersonal” and “Interpersonal” specify the
targets (U = long-sighted program, and V = short-sighted program) in self and others that those emotional states’ recalibrations were
designed to affect.
† Believable intrapersonally targets the long-sighted program only for the Trustee.
‡ Surprise may either positively or negatively target the long-sighted program in one’s self according to discovery that one has underor over-expected achievement of the long-sighted program’s goal.

Table 2: Details of Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Model

Specification

N

DF

Loglikelihood

Root Mean
Comparative
Square of
Fit Index
Approximation

Independent Valence Model:
169 57 - 4,419.15
.144
.767
Zero (0) PA/NA Correlation
Bipolar Valence Model:
2
Negative (-1) PA/NA
169 57 -4, 371.49
.131
.808
Correlation
Unrestricted Valence Model:
3
Unrestricted PA/NA
169 58 -4, 371.14
.131
.808
Correlation
Recalibrational Model:
R
169 63 -4, 271.68
.099
.892
5 Factors
Note: One observation, where the participant reported the same value for all emotions was dropped.
1

Bayesian
Information
Criteria

Difference in fit
compared to Model
R

9,130.71

Chi2(6)= 147.47
p < .001

9,035.39

Chi2(6)= 99.81
p < .001

9,039.82

Chi2(5)= 99.46
p < .001

8,866.55

Table 3: Details of Structural Equation Fit Analyses
Root Mean
Square of
Approximation

Comparative
Fit Index

Bayesian
Information
Criteria

N

DF

Loglikelihood

Unrestricted Valence Model

169

62

- 4,784.99

.125

.799

9,888.03

Recalibrational Model

169

69

- 4,681.98

.099

.880

9,717.92

Model

Difference in fit
compared to
Unrestricted
Valence

Chi2(7)=103.01
p < .001

Table 4: Structural Loadings and Equation Level Goodness of Fit for Valence
and Recalibrational Models
Valence Model
Beta
S
.202 ***
L
.702 ***
S
-.335 ***
L
-.590 ***

Recalibration Model
Structural
SE
R
Beta
SE
PA
(.063)
.439
L1
S
.180 *** (.056)
(.043)
L
.691 *** (.044)
NA
(.065)
.328
L2
L
.644 *** (.068)
(.054)
L4
S
-.348 *** (.064)
L
-.589 *** (.054)
L5
L
-.199 ** (.082)
Beta/
Beta/
Measurement
Intercept
SE
R2
Intercept
SE
Appreciative
PA
.835 *** (.025)
.697
L1
.833 *** (.025)
Constant 1.105
Constant 1.135
Happy
PA
.919 *** (.015)
.845
L1
.921 *** (.015)
Constant 1.408
Constant 1.439
Content
PA
.831 *** (.026)
.690
L1
.832 *** (.026)
Constant 1.586
Constant 1.614
Cheerful
PA
.876 *** (.020)
.767
L1
.873 *** (.021)
Constant 1.023
Constant 1.055
Triumphant
PA
.795 *** (.030)
.632
L1
.793 *** (.030)
Constant 1.044
Constant 1.071
Inspired
PA
.665 *** (.044)
.443
L1
.657 *** (.045)
Constant .866
Constant .893
Secure
PA
.639 *** (.047)
.408
L1
.640 *** (.047)
Constant 1.441
Constant 1.461
Believable
PA
.507 *** (.059)
.257
L2
.573 *** (.062)
Constant 1.373
Constant 1.418
Proud
PA
.658 *** (.045)
.433
L2
.743 *** (.057)
Constant 1.256
Constant 1.314
Disgusted
NA
.808 *** (.029)
.654
L4
.800 *** (.030)
Constant 2.107
Constant 2.104
Jealous
NA
.507 *** (.059)
.258
L4
.510 *** (.059)
Constant 1.875
Constant 1.880
Aggravated
NA
.901 *** (.018)
.812
L4
.907 *** (.017)
Constant 2.188
Constant 2.198
Frustrated
NA
.885 *** (.020)
.782
L4
.889 *** (.019)
Constant 2.121
Constant 2.129
Angry
NA
.870 *** (.021)
.758
L4
.873 *** (.021)
Constant 2.179
Constant 2.185
Depressed
NA
.670 *** (.045)
.449
L4
.660 *** (.046)
Constant 2.129
Constant 2.124
Sad
NA
.744 *** (.037)
.554
L4
.737 *** (.037)
Constant 2.114
Constant 2.111
Embarrassed
NA
.430 *** (.066)
.185
L5
.679 *** (.049)
Constant 1.743
Constant 1.526
Ashamed
NA
.115
(.079)
.013
L5
.902 *** (.035)
Constant 1.610
Constant 1.714
Guilty
NA
.095
(.079)
.009
L5
.816 *** (.038)
Constant 1.496
Constant 1.598
Note: Standardized beta reported. Equation level R2 reported for each dependent variable.
* indicates statistical significance at p < .10, ** significant at p < .05, and *** at p < .01.
2

R2
.427
.415
.330
.039
R2
.693
.848
.693
.761
.629
.432
.409
.328
.553
.640
.260
.823
.791
.763
.436
.543
.461
.814
.665

